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RECENT CASES
Whatever the outcome:
The statute as here applied creates a clash between law and
morality for which no exigency exists . . . . The law cannot
be adequately enforced by the courts alone, or by courts
supported merely by the police and the military. The true secret
of legal might lies in the habits of conscientious men
disciplining themselves to obey the law they respect without the
necessity of judicial and administrative orders. When the law
treats a reasonable, conscientious act as a crime it subverts its
own power. It invites civil disobedience. It impairs the very
habits which nourish and preserve the law.4 6
SANDOR W. SHAPERY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT- STATES MAY
NOT PROHIBIT MERE PRIVATE POSSESSION OF OBSCENE
MATRIAL. Stanley v. Georgia (U.S. 1969).
An investigation into the suspected bookmaking activities of
Robert Eli Stanley led to the issuance of a search warrant by a
United States Commissioner. Under the authority of this warrant,
Stanley's residence was searched. Little evidence of illegal
wagering was discovered, but three reels of motion picture film
were found in a desk drawer in Stanley's bedroom. After the
investigators viewed the films on Stanley's projector, the reels
were seized as contraband obscene matter.' Stanley was arrested,
indicted for possession of obscene matter in violation of Georgia
law, 2 tried and convicted in the Superior Court of Fulton County.
The Supreme Court of Georgia3 affirmed the conviction
reasoning that obscenity is not entitled to the protection of the
first amendment under the rule of Roth v. United States4 and that
46. 297 F. Supp. at 910-11.
I. Appellant did not argue that the materials seized were not obscene. Therefore, the
Court assumed, for purposes of decision, that the films would be classified as obscene
matter under any presently accepted test. 394 U.S. at 557 n.2.
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968), which reads in pertinent part, "Any
person . . . who shall knowingly have possession of. . . any obscene matter . . . shall,
if such person has knowledge or reasonably should know of the obscene nature of such
matter, be guilty of a felony ....-
3. Cf Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309, 312 (1968). The exact ground
was not urged until argument before the United States Supreme Court. Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 560 (1969).
4. Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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the States, subject only to other constitutional limitations,' are
free to deal with obscenity in any manner deemed necessary.
On appeal to Supreme Court of the United States, held,
reversed: The Georgia obscenity statute, insofar as it punishes the
mere private possession of obscene matter, violated the
defendant's rights of privacy under the first and fourteenth
amendments. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
In 1957, the United States Supreme Court for the first time
was squarely presented with the issues of whether or not obscenity
statutes6 might violate the first amendment rights of freedom of
speech and of the press in Roth v. United States. The dispositive
question there was whether obscene material is an utterance within
the area of protected speech and press. The Court first stated that:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full
protection of the guarantees, unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. 7
The Court then proceeded to adopt a definition of obscenity
as that material, which when taken as a whole, (1) appeals to the
prurient interests of the average person, and (2) when applying
contemporary community standards, goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in the description or representation of
such matter." The Court found that such material is utterly
without redeeming social importance, and is not an utterance
within the protection of the first amendment rights of speech and
press.9
Thus, Roth provided a line separating protected from
unprotected speech. If the material before the Court was
determined to be obscene, it fell beneath that line and could be
5. The Georgia court found that the search was reasonable and that no rights of the
defendant had been violated. This issue was not considered in the majority opinon of the
Supreme Court, but Justices Stewart, Brennan and White would have reversed the
conviction on the basis of an illegal search and seizure. 394 U.S. at 569-72.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1966); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311(3), (4) (West 1955) repealed
by CAL. STATS. 1961, ch. 2147 § 1.
7. 354 U.S. at 484.
8. Id. at 487 & n.20, approving MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No.
6, 1956). That section appears not to have been included in the Proposed Official Draft
of 1962.
9. 354 U.S. at 485.
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suppressed without any determination of the clear and present
danger that would otherwise result." The problem was thought by
the Justices to be that of classification of material as obscene or
not obscene. Once the status of the matter was established, the
proper result followed easily.
Since 1957, the Roth rule has been stated time and time
again, with seeming lack of qualification. However, Roth dealt
with the commercial exploitation of obscene material through the
mails. Subsequent cases have dealt with possession of obscene
matter with intent to sell or distribute,' prosecutions for the
actual sale or distribution of the prohibited matter,1 2 prevention
of distribution or mailing of obscenity, 3 procedures for
predistribution approval of material, 4 seizure of obscene matter
kept for commercial purposes,' 5 and sale of pornographic material
to minors."6
In this series of cases, a few emerged to expose the
inadequacies of the Roth definitional approach. It became
necessary to modify the definition and to create exceptions to the
definition as modified in order for the Court to reach what it
considered a just result. The problem first appeared in Memoirs
v. Massachusetts,17 where the Supreme Court was confronted with
a novel that was obscene by a strict application of the Roth
definition; however, the novel was of some slight literary worth.
This presented a dilemma, for Roth had proclaimed that matter
fitting the definition was therefore "utterly without redeeming
social importance."'" In order to escape the problem, the Court
found it necessary to redefine obsenity. Whereas in Roth, material
10. Id. at 486-87.
II. Redrup v. New York (Gent v. Arkansas), 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Mishkin v. New
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
12. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
13. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
14. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
15. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); see also A Quantity of Copies
of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966)
(proceeding in equity against a book, but possession was criminal only with an intent to
distribute).
16. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas,
390 U.S. 676 (1968).
17. 383 U.S.413 (1966).
18. 354 U.S. at484.
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was utterly without redeeming social value because it was obscene;
after Memoirs, a'n utterance must be found to be utterly without
redeeming social value as a pre-condition to declaring it obscene.
By changing the inadequate definition, the Court elevated material
that would have been obscene under Roth to a position of
protected speech.' 9
Subsequent to Memoirs, the Court was faced with three
situations presenting the opposite problem. In all three cases, the
material involved was not abstractly obscene as measured by Roth
and Memoirs, however, the actions of the defendants in marketing
the material appeared reprehensible, but the Court could not
prohibit the act unless the material involved was found obscene.
In Ginzburg v. United States," the Court held that material
could become obscene by the defendant's manner of presentation
and his form of advertising. Ginzburg can be classified as a
panderer, that is, he presented the material as a whole so that it
would appeal primarily to the prurient interests of prospective
customers. The titillating aspects of the matter were deliberately
and calculatingly emphasized. In doing these things, Ginzburg
announced the obscenity of his material to the Court.2 ' In
Mishkin v. New York, 22 the Court held that when matter is
directed to a particular, clearly defined group, rather than to the
general public, the prurient interest of that group may be
substituted for that of the average person. To some extent
Mishkin is analogous to Ginzburg, for in both, the defendants
were directing material to a certain audience on the basis of the
appeal of the matter to that group.
19. The Roth-Model Penal Code test for obscenity replaced the test enunciated by
Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868) which would permit matter to be declared
obscene on the basis of the effect of isolated passages on particularily susceptible persons.
Memoirs can be viewed as a complete inversion of that standard, for under Memoirs the
material can be salvaged because of some slight social value.
20. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
21. The situation was exactly opposite to that in Memoirs. In Menoirs, the importer
or distributor of the novel with considerable pornographic content had legitimate motives
in acting; that is, he desired to sell the novel for its literary value rather than for its prurient
content. In fact, the Court in Memoirs stated that the circumstances of production, sale
and publicity are relevant in determining whether or not the publication or distribution of
the book is protected. when the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the erotically arousing
aspects of the work, the Court will accept the evaluation of the defendant at face value.
383 U.S. at 420-21.
22. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
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In Ginsberg v. New York, 23 the defendant was directing
material to a specified audience consisting of minors. The New
York statute24 prohibiting the sale of material obscene to minors
was upheld to a- great extent because of the recognized state
concern for the welfare of minors in protecting them from
exposure to pornography before they are fully developed
sociologically and psychologically.21 As in Mishkin, the Court
held that the prurient appeal of the group toward which the
material is directed may be utilized in the definition of obscenity.6
Thus the Court has had to improvise, expand and contract
the definition of obscenity so as to work within the Roth
framework and still reach a result compatible with the first
amendment. In Ginzburg, Mishkin and Ginsberg, the defendants
were all in some sense engaged in pandering, that is, each was
engaged in conduct exploiting the cravings of a certain group of
individuals for material with pornographic content. The cases thus
seem to suggest that the Court has accepted Chief Justice
Warren's admonition that "[tihe conduct of the defendant is the
central issue, not the obsceiity of a book or picture. '2 7
Stanley v. Georgia, unlike the preceeding cases, did not
involve any commercial exploitation of obscene material, but
involved a conviction for the mere possession of obscenity. There
has been determined a spfficiently valid public interest in dealing
'with the regulation of commercial uses of obscenity," but:
[Stanley asserted] the right to read or observe what he
pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional
needs in the privacy of his own home. He [asserted] the right
to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his library.2
23. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
24. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (MeKinney 1967).
25. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. at 498 n.1.
26. In United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), the
court found that the average persons test of Roth was based on the fact that in Roth the
materials were presented to the general public. This rule was felt to be nothing more than
a particular application of the "all those whom the material is likely to reach" test
enunciated in United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936). This appears to
have been adopted by the Supreme Court in Ginzburg. Mishkin and Ginsberg.
27. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
28. The Court stated: "Inhere is always the danger that obscene material might fall
into the hands of children, (citation omitted), or that it might intrude upon the sensibilities
or privacy of the general public." 394 U.S. at 567. In addition to the two above dangers,
in Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. at 769, the Court added pandering of the sort found in
Ginzburg.
29. 394 U.S. at 565.
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Against these interests and rights, Georgia contended that the
difficulty of proving actual distribution or intent to distribute
made the prohibition of possession of obscene matter a necessary
incident to effective state control of distribution. Even if the
claimed difficulties did exist, the Supreme Court felt that the need
to alleviate the problem could not justify such a serious invasion
of fundamental individual rights.'"
Georgia also argued that "[e]xposure to obsenity may lead
to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence." '3' This
possibility, although slight, is sufficient to justify state action
under the Roth proposition that obscenity is not protected by the
first amendment.3 2 The Supreme Court declared, however, that the
mere classification or categorization of any matter as obscene is
not sufficient justification for an invasion of the personal liberties
guaranteed by the first amendment. The state must be able to say
more than contact with obscene matter may be harmful. 33
The Court concluded that while the states have broad
authority under their police powers to regulate obscenity, such
authority does not
reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own home, what
books he may read or what films he may watch.34
Without more, Stanley v. Georgia vindicates the right of
privacy, while leaving the line of cases from Roth through
Ginsberg undisturbed. However, the Court appears to have gone
beyond that point in establishing the rule of the case. In
establishing Stanley's right to possess obscene material under the
first amendment, the Court looked to the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Brennan in Lamont v. Postmaster General3 In
Lamont, a federal statute which authorized the detention and
ultimate destruction of unsealed mail which constituted
communist political propaganda from foreign countries, unless
the addressee indicated to the Post Office Department that he
30. Id. at 567-68.
31. Id. at 566.
32. See text accompanying note 10, supra.
33. 394 U.S. at 565-67.
34. Id. at 565.
35. 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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desired to receive the material, was held unconstitutional. The
matter involved was of such a nature that it could be legitimately
created and disseminated. 36 Justice Brennan wrote that although
the first amendment does not include any specific guarantee of
individual access to publications, the protection of the Bill of
Rights extends beyond the specific guarantees to implicit rights,
equally fundamental, so that the specific rights are made fully
meaningful. The right to distribute and the right to receive the
product of speech or the press are among such implicitly
fundamental rights.37
Unlike Lamont, the material involved in Stanley was, more
likely than not, not protected in its creation and dissemination
under existing statutes and judicial opinions. When material may
be created and distributed the need for the right to receive
logically follows, but if material cannot be created and
disseminated, there need be no right of receipt.
The Stanley Court stated that the right to receive ideas and
information is constant regardless of the social worth of the
matter." Furthermore, the right is not limited to the transmission
of ideas and information alone. In Winters v. New York,3 9 the
Court found that the line dividing ideas from entertainment is
extremely nebulous, if there is such a division at all, for ideas are
often contained within the dimensions of entertainment. Such a
line, the Winters Court stated, is far too elusive for the courts to
attempt any demarcation.40 Furthermore, in Stanley, the Court
upheld the defendant's right to satisfy both his intellectual and his
emotional needs in the privacy of his home.4 Since entertaining
matter would fall within the category of material satisfying the
emotional needs of the defendant, the Court seems to say that one
may be entertained by "obscene" matter. If entertainment may
be seen as a social value, it can be argued that material, even when
distasteful to the vast majority of society, could not be declared
"obscene" under the Memoirs test.42
36. The Court also relied on Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)
where the materials involved were circulars advertising a religious meeting to be held by
Jehovah's Witnesses.
37. 381 U.S. at 308.
38. 394 U.S. at 564.
39. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
40. Id. at 510.
41. See text accompanying note 29, supra.
42. It must be remembered that in Memoirs, the literary style and content of the novel
1970]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
These arguments appear tenuous at first; however, the Court
held that Stanley had the constitutional right to receive and
possess obscene matter. In order for this right to have any
meaning, some other person must be able to exercise a correlative
right to create and distribute that material. To invert Mr. Justice
Brennan's argument, just as the right to create and disseminate
is without meaning unless another can receive the communicative
product, the right to receive and possess is impotent without
another's right to create and disseminate. Therefore, Stanley,
Lamont and Winters, when taken together, appear to authorize
and legitimize some form of creation, sale and distribution of
pornographic matter. 3
The Court's refusal to accept the simple classification of
matter as "obscene" as sufficient justification for the restriction
of first amendment guarantees, indicates quite clearly that the
Court has rejected the approach created by Roth. The result seems
to be that the creation, dissemination and receipt of "obscene"
matter is entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights as is all
other speech; in other words-speech is speech. However, the
dangers inherent in the conduct of the defendants in the prior
cases, may well be sufficiently grave so as to justify state action
to regulate such conduct even though speech is somewhat
infringed. For example, in the case of sales to minors, the Court
in Ginsberg recognized that obscene material is especially
appealing to the minor because of his immature state and his
desire to gain a degree of sexual release. Because of this, the minor
is not able to make rational, informed choices whether to accept
or reject the matter. The state, therefore, may remove the minor
from that situation by prohibiting the sale to minors of materials
obscene to the minor.44
imparted some social worth t6 the book, that is, the novel was intrinsically valuable. In
the case of entertainment, the result produced through the use of the material may have
some social value even though the matter is of itself valueless.
43. The sale would have to be restricted much in the manner as is the sale of alcoholic
beverages. There could be no sales to minors, no solicitation or advertising so as to impinge
upon the privacy of others and no pandering of the matter. See note 28, supra.
44. It may also be argued that in order to realize the value of uninhibited speech, so
that speech will answer speech and propaganda will combat propaganda, the minor must
first be provided with an adequate basis for evaluating the material presented him and to
participate in the dialogue. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951). As the
nucleus of society, the family should be entitled to the first opportunity to prepare the
minor for adult life by providing him with values deemed desirable by the family unit.
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If Stanley v. Georgia is extended beyond the limited express
holding of the case so that creation and distribution of "obscene"
material is permitted, and if the function of the state in this area
is that of regulation of conduct where the dangers involved are
sufficiently great so as to permit some limited suppression of
speech, questions arise in the context of private possession of
pornographic material as to what uses the possessor may put that
material. Could Stanley exhibit his films to the membership
committee of some fraternal organization as a lever to gaining
admittance? May the possessor show the material to his own
minor children45 or to the minor children of others with or without
parental consent? May he view or project objectionable films in
such a manner that the neighbor's wife cannot help but see them,
e.g., through the kitchen window while washing the supper dishes?
Could he use such material with a mixed married group as a
prelude to some socially unaccepted sexual practices?
Further questions arise when the possessor has "satisfied his
intellectual and emotional needs."46 Perhaps he would wish to
save the material and periodically peruse it as one does a favorite
novel, but that is doubtful. What then may he do with it? Could
he trade such matter, give it to a friend or sell it to another
individual (perhaps a minor) for the other's personal use? Would
he be able to advertise his desire to trade or sell in the local
newspaper?
There are, no doubt, certain actions that the private possessor
could not undertake in the use of his "obscene" material. It
would appear that the same dangers are present in a non-
iommercial as well as a commercial setting. Public concern about
the evils of pandering and sales or exhibitions to minors is
sufficiently great to justify prohibition or regulation of any acts
with regard to the product of speech that fall within those
classifications. Equally important is the right of privacy of those
who do not desire to suffer exposure to the matter but who cannot
avoid exposure. Most likely, such conduct may be regulated,
without an unconstitutional infringement upon first amendment
rights, even after Stanley v. Georgia.
ANTHONY LOVETT
45. The Court in Ginsberg was of the opinion that the statute which prohibited sales
to minors did not bar the parent who wished to expose his child to pornographic material
from doing so. 390 U.S. at 639.
46. 394 U.S. at 565.
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